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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL M. GARDNER 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
Case No. 16615 
SHANNADEAN DIPO CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant and Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for the recovery of damages claimed 
by plaintiff by reason of defendant's failure to convey real property, 
pursuant to an option agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court awarded plaintiff as damages the sum 
of $2, 000, finding that the market value of the real property subject to 
the option agreement, at the time the option was to be exercised, was 
$80, 000, which was also the option purchase price, less $2, 00 paid for 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the option, which sum was to be credited to the purchase price, and 
which sum constituted plaintiff's damage. The court did not award 
snecial damages or attorney's fees. From the judgment, the plaintiff 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court 
sustained as being a proper award. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 18, 1977, defendant executed an option agreement 
to one Mike Heyrend for the purchase of a parcel of unimproved real 
property located in Salt Lake County, herein referred to as the 
"Christensen Property". The option agreement (Ex. 3-P), provided 
for the payment of $1, 000 as consideration for the option, and provided 
for a purchase price of $80, 000, with the option fee of $1, 000 to be 
applied to the purchase price, if the option was exercised. The option 
was subsequently extended for an additional $1, 000, to October 18, 
1977 (Ex. P-9). All negotiations were conducted by David Helm, as 
agent for Mike Heyrend. The option was obtained in an attempt to put 
2 
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together a development, which would include other property, including 
property hereinafter referred to as the DeGooyer Property". The 
proposed development also involved zoning approval and other require-
ments (Ex P-137). The final preparation of the option was done by 
defendant's attorney, but was not subject to any restrictions or require-
ments involving the purchase of the DeGooyer Property. 
An earnest money offer to the purchase of the DeGooyer 
Property was made by Mike Heyrend on May 11, 1977 (Ex. P-2), subject 
to the obtaining of the Christensen Property. 
Defendant's option, by its terms, had to be exercised 
by August 18, 1977 (Ex. P-3), and the DeGooyer earnest money 
agreement had to be closed by August 15, 1977 (Ex. P-2). 
On August 17, 1977, defendant's option was extended 
for an additional 60 days, or until October 18, 1977 (Ex. P-9); 
however, the DeGooyer earnest money agreement had expired by its 
own terms. Prior to the extension of the option agreement, Mike 
Heyrend entered into an earnest money agreement on August 3, 1977 
(Ex. P-12), agreeing to sell to Probe Construction Company his 
3 
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interests in the Christensen option and other property, which agreement 
was to be performed by September 15, 1977. This agreement was not 
completed within the time required of September 15, 1977. 
On September 27, 1977, Heyrend submitted an earnest 
money agreement to DeGooyer for the purchase of their property, which 
agreement was not accepted until October 27, 1977 (Ex. P-8). In the 
meantime, Heyrend, on October 14, 1977, assigned the Christensen 
option to Probe Realty, Inc. , by a written assignment (Ex. P-13D); 
however, the assignment did not include the proposed DeGooyer earnest 
money agreement (Ex. P-8), so that Probe Realty, Inc. , had only the 
bare option to purchase the Christensen property, and nothing else. 
Probe Realty, Inc., on October 18, 1977, assigned the option agreement 
to Probe Realty, Inc., who assigned it to the plaintiff (Ex. P-21); 
again, only the Christensen option, and nothing else, was assigned to 
the plaintiff (R 190). Plaintiff expended no money, plaintiff received no 
assignment of monies spent, and plaintiff had nothing other than an 
assignment of an option that was to expire on the day of the assignment. 
Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to damages consisting 
4 
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of monies spent by Mr. Heyrend for engineering expenses in connection 
with a development plan for not only the Christensen Property, but also 
the DeGooyer Property and other property. He also claims damages 
based upon the increased value that could be attributed to the Christensen 
Property, when considered together with the DeGooyer Property as a 
combined property; this, although plaintiff did not own or even have a 
right to purchase the DeGooyer Property. 
On October 18, 1977, when plaintiff attempted to exercise 
the Christensen option, the earnest money offer (Ex. P-12) by Probe, 
Inc. , to purchase the Heyrend interest in these properties had expired 
by its terms, because it had not been completed on September 15, 1977 
(R-188); the DeGooyer Property had an unaccepted offer by Mike 
Heyrend pending, and the plaintiff had an assignment of the subject 
option, subject to no qualifications or restrictions. 
From the evidence, the court found that the measure of 
damages was only the market value, without considering the possible 
value increase that may have been associated with the acquisition of 
the DeGooyer Property. The court further concluded that the engineering 
5 
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costs and other expenses were not a less resulting from defendant's 
failure to convey the property. 
Since no evidence of attorney's fees was presented to the 
court, the court did not make an award of fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY ASSESSED DAMAGES 
AS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARKET 
VALUE AND OPTION PRICE. 
The general rule followed by Utah courts is that a 
purchaser, in a claim for wrongful refusal to convey under an agreement 
of purchase, is entitled to damages equal to the difference between the 
market value of the land at the time of the breach, and the agreed 
purchase price. This, in effect, gives the purchaser, as damages, the 
benefit of his bargain in the event that the land appreciates in value. 
In the case of Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P. 2d 250, 
this court said: 
"The general rule as to damages in such circum-
stances is that where a vendor breaches his 
6 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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contract to convey property, the vendee is entitled 
to the benefit of his bargain; that is, he is entitled 
to the market value of the property at the time he 
would be entitled to receive conveyance thereof, 
less the amount he agreed to pay." 
Justice J. Allan Crockett, in writing the foregoing opinion, 
cited the cases of Smith v. Warr, Ut 1977, 564 P. 2d 771, and Bunnell v. 
Bills, Ut 1962, 368 P. 2d 597. In the Smith case, the court ruled as 
follows: 
"The rule followed by Utah is that benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages are to be awarded for breach of contract for 
the sale of real estate, regardless of the good faith of 
the party in breach. " 
In Bunnell, the court held: 
"The measure of damages, where the vendor has 
breached a land sale contract, is the market value 
of the property at the time of the breach, less the 
contract price to the vendee. " 
In each of the foregoing cases, the court cited the case 
of Andreason v. Hansen, 335 P. 2d 404, for the rule that: 
"Proper measure of damages is the difference 
between the offer and the market value. " 
In this case, the plaintiff seeks damages in excess of 
those allowed by the court, on the basis that he has been damaged 
7 
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because of the fact that the subiect property, if owned together with 
surrounding properties, would be worth a great deal more than its 
separate value as determined by appraisal (Ex. P-16, P-17). The 
court correctly found that the market value at time of the option was 
to be exercised was the same as the option price, to-wit: $80, 000, 
and that therefore plaintiff was only entitled to the $2, 000 paid on the 
option and to be credited against the purchase price. 
Since the facts established that the option was given 
without consideration for any other properties, and was an option to 
purchase the subject property for $80, 000, notwithstanding any other 
purchases, the claim that failure of the defendant to convey is the 
basis for lost profit damages, is without basis. This is particularly 
true where the DeGooyer Property was neither owned by the plaintiff, 
nor was it ever under an accepted earnest money agreement in favor 
of the plaintiff or anyone else, at the time the option was to be 
exercised (Ex. P-8). 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSh'1"G TO 
AW ARD SPECIAL DAMAGES FOR COSTS AND 
EXPENSES. 
8 
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It is generally the rule that no recovery can be had for 
loss of profits which is dependent upon a subsequent or subordinate 
agreement, even if the subsequent agreement was entered into upon 
the faith of the principal contract, when the collateral contract was 
not in the contemplation of the defaulting party at the time the principal 
contract was entered into. See Am Jur 2nd, Damages, P 95. 
In addressing the question of special damages, such as 
are here requested by plaintiff, this court, in Ranch Homes, Inc. , v. 
Greater Park City Corp (Ut 1970), 592 P. 2d 620, stated: 
"The rule is that the damages to be awarded for 
breach of contract are those that are foreseeable 
as a natural and probable consequence of the 
breach. In other words, the only damages 
recoverable are those that could reasonably be 
foreseen and anticipated by the parties at the 
time the contract was entered into. Mere know-
ledge of possible harm is not enough; the defendant 
must have reason to foresee, as a probable result 
of the breach, the damages claimed. " 
The court further stated: 
"The particular nature of an option requires that 
the parties incur no more expenses than are neces-
sary, and that those expenses reflect only what is 
required to be done before the option can be exercised. " 
9 
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When you consider the many offers to purchase, 
assignments of interest, and all other negotiations that went on between 
Helm, Heyrend, Probe Construction, Probe Realty, Probe, Inc., and 
the plaintiff Gardner, it is difficult to know who was developing what, 
and exactly how the defendant's option was to be used. There is no way 
that the defendant could have reasonably anticipated or supposed that 
the claimed expenses would be made. Had she known of the juggling 
act that was being performed, she could well have wondered whether 
or not any real action would be taken with her property. 
It is clear that at no time did the plaintiff expend any 
funds for the expenses of development proposals, nor did he have an 
assignment of such expenses. It is also clear that the only property 
subject to any valid claim on October 18, 1977, was the Christensen 
Property. In view of the fact that the plaintiff had received his interest 
in the option on the last day it could be exercised would indicate that he 
was only attempting to keep a "potential something" in hand. He suffered 
no special damages, and the court correctly so ruled. 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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POlliT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION rn REFUSIN"G TO ALLOW ATTORNEY'S 
FEES. 
It is recognized that a claim for attorney's fees must be 
based upon a statutory provision or a contractual agreement. 
If based upon a written contract providing for payment of 
attorney's fees without specifying the amount, then the court is without 
authority to fix any such fees without proof as to what is a reasonable 
fee. This is as much a part of plaintiff's case as any other part, and 
must require the same attention. vVhen plaintiff concludes its case and 
rests, the court is in a position to render judgment. At some point, 
the evidence must conclude and the matter be presented for ruling. 
Here, the plaintiff rested its case without evidence of the contract 
requirement to pay fees --- to which the defendant could have responded ---
and without evidence as to amount. 
In the case of FMA Financial Corp. v. Build Inv. , 
17 Ut 2 80, 404 P. 2d 670, the court, in addressing this subject, said: 
"It is fundamental that the judgment must be 
based upon findings of fact, which in turn must 
11 
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be based upon the evidence ... However, it was 
an issue of fact which was denied. Thus, it was 
a part of the-plaintiff's case to which it had the 
burden of proving. Failing to offer proof of any 
character on this issue had the same effect as 
would the failure to offer proof as to any other 
controverted issue. There is nothing upon which 
to base a finding. " 
• 
The fact that the court refused to allow plaintiff to reopen 
his case during final arguments was not an abuse of the court's discretior. · 
but was well within the discretion of the court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the only interest that the plaintiff can 
claim is a last minute assignment to the Christensen option, and that 
any claimed damages must be based upon that interest only. Therefore, 
the court correctly determined that plaintiff's damage was the difference 
between the market value of the property on October 18, 1977, less the 
purchase price agreed. Since the market value and the purchase price 
were the same, the damages were properly assessed at the sum of 
$2, 000, the amount paid on the option to be credited against the 
purchase price. 
12 
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As to the matter of plaintiff's claim to special damages, 
for engineering fees and other costs, the fact that those costs were 
expended by someone other than plaintiff, without assignment to 
plaintiff, and the fact that these were not costs anticipated by defendant, 
nor expenses reasonably contemplated at the time the option was given, 
clearly shows that plaintiff had no claim for those expenses and costs, 
and that the court correctly denied plaintiff's claim. 
The court, having no evidence as to attorney's fees, 
properly did not make such award. 
Respectfully submitted this __ 3:;.;r:...d"--- day of June 
1980, 
WALTER R. ELLETT 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of June 1980, I mailed 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to L. Benson 
Mabey, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 102, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
/s/ Walt•r R. Ellett 
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